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Responsibility and Law:
In Defense of the McNaghten Rules
by Jerome Hall • Professor of Law at Indiana University

* In the September, 1955, issue of the Journal, we carried an article by Solicitor
General Simon E. Sobeloff (now a Judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals)
proposing that the traditional legal test for insanity-the McNaghten rule-be
abolished on the ground that it is obsolete and unscientific. Professor Hall disagrees sharply with Judge Sobeloff arguing that the "right and wrong" test, far
from being obsolete, is fundamental in our standards of morality.

* In

his

recent article in this
Judge Simon E. Sobeloff
reveals a humanitarian concern regarding the issue of insanity under
present rules and a commendable
desire to adopt reforms in accordance with the progress of science. It
is evident, however, that the position
taken by the then Solicitor General
rests entirely upon the dubious
theories of certain psychiatrists who
have long been extremely hostile
critics of criminal responsibility.
The issues thus raised extend far beyond the boundaries of the criminal
law-important as those are. In fact,
they challenge the very foundation
of Anglo-American law.
JOURNAL,'

The McNaghten Rules
A Restatement of Old Law
The core of the McNaghten rules is
that, "to establish a defence on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did

know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong."' 2 What are
the criticisms of these rules which
the extremist psychiatrists, whose
theories are accepted by Judge Sobeloff, have vigorously urged? First, the
rules are said to be the product of an
age of unsound, rationalistic psychology. That psychiatry has contributed much to the knowledge of
human nature during the past seventy-five years may be readily granted. But the McNaghten rules, far
from being a creation of the nineteenth century legal mind, were a
restatement of very old law-the novelty being merely the restriction of
the test to the particular conduct in
issue. The test of rationality expressed in the rules can be traced to
the thirteenth century legal treatise
by Bracton, and thence ultimately to
the ancient Greeks, especially to
Aristotle and Plato. When Judge
Sobeloff echoes a psychiatrist's ridicule of an eighteenth century judge's
reference to a "wild beast test" he
blinks the fact that, in its historical
context, this was merely a metaphor
distinguishing normal human intel-

ligence from instinctive animal behavior.
The enduring elements in the
long tradition, which the McNaghten rules preserve, may be briefly indicated.3 The first wing of the rules,
that which concerns knowledge of
"the nature and quality of the act he
was doing", refers to normal functions of perceiving and interpreting
ordinary phenomena as a test of normal competence. The emphasis is
factual-in his relation to the things
and persons about him, does the defendant have the normal capacity to
understand their principal characteristics and the consequences of ordinary actions? These rational functions are also dealt with in psychiatry
in terms of the "ego" and the "reality principle", but few systematic
studies on the "cognitive functions
of the ego have as yet been published .... '4
1. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law:

From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41
A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
2. McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210,
8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
3. For a fuller discussion of the issues con-

cerning mental disease, together with documentation and citations supporting the following analysis, see the writer's GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
Or
CRIMINAL LAW,
Chapter 14
(1947), and his articles, Psychiatry and the
Law, 38 IOWA L. REv. 687 (1953) and Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.
JOUs. 761 (1956).

4. "Now

conscious thought by means

of

speech signs is the highest accomplishment of

the psychical apparatus, and alone makes adjustment to reality possible .. " Ferenczi,
CONTRIBUTIONS

TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

195

(1916).

The quotation in the text is from Alexander,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
85 (1948).
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The second half of the McNaghten rules, which concerns the capacity to understand that "he was doing
what was wrong", is also of ancient origin. But throughout history,
from Socrates' opponents to the recent Vienna positivists, sophisticates
have opposed the very possibility of
sound moral decision, stigmatizing
that and all relevant standards as
mere pretense, self-deception and
sheer "nonsense". It is possible here
only to note, as any reader may verify, that the attack of extremist psychiatrists on the "right and wrong"
test reflects that philosphy.5 In
sharp contrast, the work of the most
profound thinkers through the ages
as well as common sense and the
legal order, especially of democratic
societies, make very much sense of
morality. They affirm and exemplify
the validity of thoughtful moral decisions. In sum, what must be held
in view is that the McNaghten rules
specify normal rational functions
regarding certain conduct as a test
of serious mental disease-to be insane is to be irrational.
Judge Sobeloff is persuaded that
this test of insanity is quite fallacious. He asserts, "This test, known
familiarly as the 'right and wrong
test', turns on a specified and very
limited symptom of insanity, which
science no longer deems necessarily
or even

typically associated

with

most serious mental disorders." 6
Elsewhere in his article the Judge
confidently asserts that "science",
"scientific facts" and "the latest
knowledge of human behavior" have
demonstrated the invalidity and irrelevance of the McNaghten rules.

Science and Psychiatry . . .
Psychology of American Law

many others draw daily upon physics and chemistry. Blood analysis,
the identification of fingerprints, ballistics and countless other scientific
facts are unhesitatingly relied upon
by the courts. It is a very serious matter, indeed, if in trials where life and
liberty are at stake, lawyers and
judges stupidly cling to unsound archaic notions when scientific knowledge is available.
What then, are this "science",
these "scientific facts" and that "latest knowledge of human behavior"
to which Judge Sobeloff has access?
His favorable comments on the opinions of certain psychiatrists and his
hearty approval of the Durham decision, 7 which relied upon these and
other psychiatrists, reveal what he
referred to when he used those impressive terms. Of what do the contributions of these psychiatrists consist, and how can they be correctly
appraised?
"Science" has definite meaning
when applied to such fields as physics
and chemistry. It designates certain
descriptive propositions or laws
(e.g., gases expand directly in proportion to increase in temperature
and inversely as to increase in pressure) which (1) generalize beyond
all the examined facts, (2) are verified by definite evidence, (3) express
a covariation of variables, e.g., as the
gas expands, the temperature rises,
and (4) are organized into a system
so that scientists can manipulate
them deductively. Psychiatry is certainly not "science" in this rigorous
sense. But, although the meaning of
the word need not concern us further, it is important to know enough
about the status of psychiatric knowledge to assess pretentious claims
and, at the same time, avoid the
equal fallacy of dismissing all psychiatry as fiction.

Now, we are accustomed in this
country to accept and use science.
We have the most highly developed
It may be hazarded that a defentechnology the world has seen; in- sible hierarchy of the various branchdeed, the genius of American cul- es of knowledge on the basis of widely
ture consists largely in a willingness, accepted criteria would probably loperhaps zealousness, to make the cate psychiatry far from rigorous scimaximum use of science. Lawyers ence and much closer to the kind of
and the legal order reflect these na- knowledge found in art and history.
tional traits. Patent lawyers and Moreover,- psychiatry is in a forma918

American Bar Association Journal

tive, uncertain period of development and almost every conceivable
theory finds support in respectable
psychiatric circles. This is not depreciation of psychiatry by a lawyer.
For example, "The best psychiatry
is still more of art than of science",
wrote a distinguished psychiatrist.8
"There are, in fact, many methods,
standpoints, views and convictions
which are all at war with one another", states Jung.9 "Psychopathology is a speculative subject ...
There is much division of opinion
among psychopathologists on basic
principles."' 0 A competent practitioner admits "the debatable character of many theories", 1' while a
forthright investigator holds that
"no critically minded person practiced in scientific research or in disciplined speculation can accept psyAnd a psycholochoanalysis ....,,12
gist, after a careful study, concludes:
"So many and so flagrant have been
the unscientific theorizing and practices of psychoanalysts during the
past 50 years that many critics of analysis have become quite disillusioned and have begun to see science
and analysis as antithetical ...
[O]rthodox analytic theory is itself
so formulated that a premium is often set on preconception and prejudice, while objectivity and openmindedness on the part of analytic
interpreters is made most difficult to
achieve and retain .... Analytic the-

ory has frequently managed to get so
far away from factual referents that
analysts easily fall into the habit of
evolving such clever, complex, and
almost fiendishly astute hypotheses
that they neglect entirely to look for
5. "When [a psychiatrist] is forced to adopt
the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is
speaking in what to him is a foreign language.
" Sobeloff, op. cit. supra note 1 at 877.
Cf. Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

526-535 (1947), and Hall, LIvINo LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, Chapter 2 (1949).

6. Sobeloff, op. cit. at 793 (italics added).
7. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
8. Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ENcYc. Soc. ScI.
580 (1934).
9. Jung, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH

OF A SOUL.

33 (1939).
10. Coleman, Psychopathology, 9Q J. MEaT.
Sci. 152 (1944).
11.Horney, NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 8
(1939).
12. Murray, Psychology and the University,
34 ARCH. NEUROL. AND PSYCHIAT. 803, 809 (1935).
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objective data with which to support

them ...

"13

Accordingly, even if lawyers were
wholly uninitiated into the psychology of human beings, they could
hardly be expected to accept all the
findings of psychiatry, including the
theories which flatly contradict everything lawyers know or believe
about human nature. It happens,
however, that lawyers are highly
trained professional persons whose
function in society is precisely to
deal with human problems. This
profession, which has studied the
conduct of human beings in very
many situations and accumulated
this knowledge in countless records,
is now presumed to know so little
about commonplace facts of human
nature that it is asked to accept the
opinions of certain psychiatrists as
science, regardless of the conflicts
among these experts and the obvious
uncertainties in this developing
field.
It is hazardous to appraise the
competence of one's own profession;
and in any case it is preferable to recall the observation of one of our
most eminent psychologists that,
"dealing as it does mainly with human behavior, the law very likely has
more to teach psychology than to

learn from

it".14

Another distin-

guished psychologist, after reviewing
the principal schools of psychology,
including psychiatry and his own
position, raised the pertinent question, how are lawyers to choose
among them? And he gave some very
sound advice-the lawyer should not
try to choose among the experts. He
should "become his own competent
critic on matters of psychological
theory. There is no easy way. There
are no official guides to lead him
through the shifting controversies
and to pick out for him just those
elements of psychological theory
which he can adopt with safety
"15

The above criticism does not imply that there is no valid knowledge
in psychiatry. Nor does it imply
that anyone-lawyer, psychiatrist or
layman-can espouse any conceivable psychological theory with as

much warrant as any other person
may claim for his view of psychology.
There is valuable knowledge in psychiatry which, if carefully selected
with reference to what is important
in law and critically appraised,
can be extremely helpful. For example, psychiatry has uncovered hidden recesses in the personality and,
even though therapy has lagged far
behind diagnosis, psychiatry can reveal much regarding motivation, disguised drives, the actual meaning of
surface rationalizations and the emotional conflicts which have influenced the commission of serious
harms. Psychiatry can also throw
light on the origin and development
of abnormal personality; and it can
discover many facts which reveal to
jurors that a person who seems to be
normal, actually thinks, feels and
acts very abnormally. This knowledge can be put to excellent use in
the administration of the law and in
the rehabilitation of offenders.
On the other hand, there is the
living psychology of the law, indicated above, which has endured
through the ages, modified and deepened by the progress of psychology,
but has retained basic insights regarding the principal characteristics
of normal and insane behavior. This
psychology should be improved in
the light of psychiatric and other
advances, but no reason or evidence
has been adduced to warrant its
abandonment, at least as regards
knowledge of ordinary mental functions which concern individual responsibility. More specifically, in the
light of existing knowledge and experience, lawyers, judges and intelligent laymen cannot be expected to
accept the notion that a rational
person may be insane. Yet, as will
shortly be shown, that is precisely
the objective of the extremist criticism of the McNaghten rules.
Responsibility . • •
A Matter of Common Sense
If one considers the meaning of the
legal tests of rationality in relation
to criminal responsibility it becomes
clear that the assault on the McNaghten rules implies much more

News

Bureau Indiana University

Professor Jerome Hall is the author of
"General Principles of Criminal Law"
(1947) and other books on criminal law
and jurisprudence. In 1954-1955, he
made an around-the-world lecture tour,
spending four months in the Far East
and nine months as Fulbright Lecturer
at the University of London Law School.
than the presumption that lawyers

are amateurs in the field of human
psychology. Ultimately, it is an attack on experience and common
sense. It assumes that even the most

thoughtful layman's experience with
his fellow men and his sensitive insight into the functioning of his own

personality in elementary acts for
which persons are held responsible,
are wholly fallacious.
It is not easy to define "responsibility" in a few words, but its import
and role in daily life are recognized
by everyone except those who assume special, sometimes necessary,
perspectives. We speak of a lawyer's
responsibility to his clients, a father's
responsibility for the welfare and
education of his children, the responsibility to perform one's contracts
and other promises, the responsibility of this generation to succeeding ones as regards the conser(Continued on page 984)
13. Ellis, An Introduction to the Principles
of Scientific Psychoanalysis, 41 GENETIC PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 155, 157, 160, 195 (Murchison ed. 1950).
14. Thorndike, MAN AND His WoRXS 133
(1943).
15. Robinson,. LAW AND THE LAWYZEs 111
(1935).
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vation of resources and the freedom
of future Americans. There is alsoneed it be added?-the responsibility
for murder, rape, robbery and breach
of the other simple duties enjoined
in criminal law, which any normal
youth or adult can easily understand.
The soldier and the policeman on
guard in the night as well as daily
experience in countless other situations also indicate the central meaning of responsibility and its vital
functions in our society. What is this
meaning and what have rational
mental functions, as stated, e.g., in
the McNaghten rules, to do with
responsiblity?
To be responsible means (I) to
be able to recognize and discharge
various duties and (2) to be morally
censurable for the voluntary breach
of those duties and legally liable if
their violation is forbidden by law.
The criminal law is concerned with
the voluntary commission of legally
forbidden harms, i.e., with .conduct
in which intelligence participates. It
is therefore concerned to determine
whether persons who commit such
harms are normal or psychotic, that
is, whether they are responsible in
the sense of being competent to understand the simple moral duties enjoined by criminal law in the way
16
normal persons understand them.

The McNagh ten rules provide tested
criteria of normal competence-and
thus of responsibility.
Only when responsibility is held in
view, with its implications of moral
obligation and the significant, if limited, capacity of free choice by normal persons, can the meaning and
grounds of punishment be grasped.
In this context it makes sense to hold
that a normal offender should be
punished-e.g., because he voluntarily killed a human being. The voluntary commission of a harm is met by
an appropriate social response
whose meaning necessarily differs
from that of rewards for service well
done. The punishment of a voluntary harmdoer is thus a rational expression of the community's values.
If the ethics of responsibility had no
place in this, there would be nothing
984

to mitigate the imposition of any
punishment, however severe, that
would actually deter convicted and
potential offenders regardless of their
mental condition.
One does not recognize the full
impact of Judge Sobeloff's position
upon the psychology and ethics of
responsibility until he realizes that it
represents not only the rejection of
irrationality as an essential element
of insanity but also acceptance of the
"irresistible impulse" theory as well
as the abandonment of the rule of
law in the determination of insanity.
In order to understand what is involved in these important issues, it is
essential to keep in mind that the
"irresistible impulse" test is a complete alternative to the McNaghten
rules. It must not be confused with
the inability to control conduct
which co-exists with and results from
disordered intelligence-that is quite
within the McNaghten rules. Under
the "irresistible impulse" test it is
necessary to instruct a jury that even
though the defendant knew the nature and consequences of his conduct
and also knew that it was morally
wrong, nonetheless he must be acquitted if his volition was so diseased
that he was "irresistibly impelled"
17
to commit the harm in issue.
The "irresistible impulse" test has
been rejected in England and a very
large majority of American states, but
it is accepted in about ten states' 8
and by some federal courts. It is
sometimes asserted that there have
been no ill effects in the states which

recognize the test but, in fact, no
study of the operation of the test has
been made. Nor is it known to what
extent judges and jurors nullify the
test or limit its significance by introducing common sense notions of human behavior and the substance of
the McNaghten rules. What can be
said about the "irresistible impulse"
test which is beyond controversy is.
that it originated a century or more
ago in a very rudimentary psychology which included speculative notions of "moral insanity" and such
curiosities as the belief that an unseen ligament might be pressing on
the mind. This confirms Dr. Frederic
Wertham's statement that "... the
conception of irresistible impulse ...
is a throwback to, or rather a survival of, the previous 'philosophical
psychological' era. . . . It forms no
part of and finds no support in
the modern dynamic psychoanalytic
study of mental processes."' 9
Since the 1953 Report of the Royal Commission, many, perhaps most,
psychiatrists who formerly accepted
the formula, "irresistible impulse"
test, have decided that those words
are improperly restrictive because,
as Judge Soboloff states it, instead of
impulsive action, there may be "long
and sustained brooding". These psychiatrists now prefer to speak in
terms of being "incapable of preventing himself from committing" the
act.2 0 But this does not in the least
imply any abandonment of the "irresistible impulse" test or theory. On
the contrary, an examination of the

16. The Judge's assertion that "Only the
drooling idiot can be said to have no knowledge of right and wrong .... " (op. cit. page
793) is a wholly incorrect interpretation of
the McNaghten rules. The rules require such
a serious, substantial departure from the normal as to constitute insanity. The standard of
"normality", though admittedly vague at the
periphery, is employed in law, psychiatry and
many other fields as an essential notion. Cf. 2
Stephen, HisTosy OF THE CRIMINAL LAW or

Attention should, however, be directed to
the questionable basis of the assumption of
the Durham decision that Smith v. United
States, 36 F. 2d 548 (1929), adopted the "irresistible impulse" test. In that case, the court,
referring to "uncontrollable impulse", said,
"This impulse must be such as to override the
reason and judgment and obliterate the sense
of right and wrong to the extent that the
accused is deprived of the power to choose
between right and wrong." (549, italics added). This sentence makes it doubtful whether
the decision did adopt the "irresistible impulse" test.
18. In some of these states, there are very
few recent decisions and the facts reported
in these are scant. It cannot be said that there
is a substantial, well-considered body of law
which supports the "irresistible impulse" test.
19. Wertham, The Psychiatry of Criminal

ENGLAxD

163 (1883).

17. Judge Sobeloff refers to Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887) as "one of the
most rewarding pieces of literature ....
" Op.
cit. supra note 1 at 794. Judge Somerville,
who wrote that opinion, held that there may
be "insane persons, of a diseased brain, who,
while capable of perceiving the difference between right and wrong, are, as matter of fact,
so far under the duress of such disease as to
destroy the power to choose between right
and wrong" (859). Judge Sobeloff's view is also shown in his complete endorsement of the
Durham decision, where it was said, " . . . in
1929, we . . . added the irresistible impulse
test .... " 214 F. 2d 872-873.

American Bar Association Journal

Guilt, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEOAL CoxcErsCRIMINAL GUsLT 164 (N.Y.U. School of Law,

1950).
20. Report of the Royal Comm. on Capital
Punishment 113, 287 (1953). discussed in 65
YALE L. Jout. 776-778 (1956).
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Report of the Royal Commission
and of relevant cases reveals that
dropping the term "impulse" is
either a merely verbal change, or
that the new formula is so vague as
to amount to no rule at all. 21 What
the new formula actually signifies is
that the psychiatrists who take that
stand insist on the unlimited application and validity of "irresistible
impulse". They take a bolder sweeping position to the effect that many
persons whom they classify as psychotic have normal intelligence.
That the Durham decision also went
farther and deeper in the direction
of the "irresistible impulse" theory
is clear from its complete acceptance
of the majority's recommendations
in the Report of the Royal Commission.22 This position has been aggressively publicized in this country.
Hence, it is not surprising that a
number of busy lawyers and judges,
and even some scholars, seeking to
improve the law, should readily find
books and articles which support
that theory. It is little wonder that
such a lawyer might conclude that
science "no longer deems [the right
and wrong test] necessarily or even
typically associated with most serious
mental disorders."
But it is also true and much more
important that psychiatrists are
sharply divided on this question and
that some of the most distinguished
of them vigorously oppose the "irresistible impulse" theory. Among
them are Norwood East, for many
years the leader of British forensic
psychiatry and, in this country, Doctors Frederic Wertham, H. A. Davidson, and others. 23 It is recognized
that there are compulsive actions,
but they are harmless ones, e.g., like
counting windows or excessive handwashing. Modern psychiatry, these
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forensic psychiatrists inform us, does
not support the notion that persons
with normal intelligence may be irresistibly impelled to kill or rob. So,
too, kleptomania, pyromania and so
on provide wide variations and complexities which may include serious
disorders that become operative at
the time of the conduct in issue or
they may be merely neurotic actions
which should not exempt these offenders from criminal liability, even
though mitigation in punishment is
24
warranted.
The "irresistible impulse" theory
also conflicts with theories which
all psychiatrists accept, e.g., the integration of the functions of the
personality. Judge Sobeloff states,
"... responsibility implies reasonable

integration of the total personality
which includes the emotions as well
as the intellect. Medical psychology
teaches that the mind cannot be split
into watertight, unrelated, autonomously functioning compartments
25
like knowing, willing and feeling."
That view of personality has not
only been very widely approved by
psychiatrists, it is also verified in
common experience. For example, a
normal person who sees a man cruelly beating a child does not coldly
recognize the immorality of that conduct; instead, his intellectual judgment is permeated with feeling, and

General Office & Factory
Box 609A, St. Petersburg 2, Fla.

tendencies to take appropriate action are also involved. If disintegration or "dissociation" occurs, the
intelligence is no longer normal. Accordingly, when lip service is paid to
common principles of right and
wrong by psychotic persons, that
provides no support of assertions
that they understand moral obligations in the way normal persons understand them.
This leads to a crucial questionif the normal personality operates
as a unit, as a coalescence of the various functions, how is it possible
that an essential phase of it, i.e., vo-

lition, can be very seriously diseased
while, at the same time, intelligence
remains normal? The writer has
raised this question many times
without receiving an adequate reply.

26

In addition to the fact that some
of the most distinguished forensic
psychiatrists oppose the "irresistible
impulse" theory, and apart from the
incompatibility of the theory with
that of the integration of normal
21. See 65 YALE L. JouR., 778-779.
22. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 873
(1954).
23. For references to the publications of
these psychiatrists, consult the citations given

in footnote 3 supra; also footnote 24.

24. See Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and
Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. FoRENsIc SciENCEs 1 (No. 2, April 1956).

25. Op. cit. 794.
26. See 65 YALE L. Jout., 775-776.
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personality, there is an even more
important reason for rejecting the
"irresistible impulse" theory, namely, that theory is diametrically opposed to the psychology and the
ethics of Anglo-American law. It is
opposed to the psychology of that
law because it contradicts the view
that normal intelligence plays an essential part in controlling conduct,
especially the voluntary conduct
which criminal law penalizes. The
deterministic premise of the "irresistible impulse" theory also contradicts the ethics of Anglo-American
law, expressed in terms of responsibility for voluntary conduct by persons who are able to make relatively
free moral decisions. Indeed, it contradicts the goal which psychiatric
therapy itself aims at when it brings
hidden facts into the open so that
the patient is brought to understand
his situation and thus to conduct
himself as a normal person.
Accordingly, one is led to ask-if
normal intelligence, with its affective support, does not participate in
the control of voluntary conduct,
what can and does control the behavior of human beings? If the pilot is
unseated, who or what guides the
ship? Let us see how Judge Sobeloff
deals with this problem.

986

so-called definition of negligence"?
The "reasonable man" is but "a chiWilliam H. Kupper, M.D.
merical creature" and such standards
as "due process", "unfair competiWE CAN'T ALL
tion", "cruel and unusual punishBE SANE!
ment" "are all as capable of expansion and contraction as the
A critical, witty book about
subjective judgment of those who
the daily comedy and
interpret them."29 Hence, he contragedies of psychiatry.
cludes, the sound thing is not to de"In short graphic language-and it is impossible
to mistake or misunderstand what he means
fine insanity in any rule of law. That
about anything-he tells how the patient got
is the Durham holding.
that way and what at least can be tried to help
him."-Long Beach, Calif. Press-Telegram
It is submitted, with deference,
that the above argument contains
220 pages
some very serious fallacies. Almost
every legal system in the world speciCloth $3.50
Paper $1.75
fies essential elements of insanity in
legal rules and does not do that with
THE COLT PRESS
reference to other diseases. One reaLackawanna Plaza
son for this practically universal stipPaterson 3, New Jersey
ulation of essential criteria of insanity is that, life and liberty depend
upon the determination of the existThe Judge not only accepts the enence of this disease. The separation
larged version of the "irresistible imof normal criminals from irresponpulse" theory which the Durham
sible sick persons goes to the root of
decision adopted; like that opinion,
even primitive legal systems.3 0 No
he also insists that even that is not
such ultimate value is involved in the
enough to satisfy "science" and the
legal determination of fractures or
"latest knowledge of human behavtyphoid.
ior". He advocates adoption of the
Second, Judge Sobeloff's distrust
"historic" New Hampshire decision
of legal rules to aid "the enlightened
of 1869, which was not recognized
understanding of the special facts of
by any other jurisdiction until 1954
each case" suggests a preference for
when the District of Columbia, in
unfettered power rather than the
the Durham case 27 chose it. "We do
sovereignty of law. This impression
not insist on a legal formula in
is strengthened by his skeptical critidiagnosing other diseases; why in
cism of "due process" and other
this instance? It is a question of
standards, noted above, despite the
fact like any other, to be defact that numerous cases specify and
cided after hearing the explanalimit their meaning, and by his dis28
tions of the experts."
If the regard of the feasibility of more speissue concerns the fracture of a bone
cific definition in other areas. His
or whether someone had typhoid, he opinion is also to be sharply concontinues, it would be absurd to spe- trasted with that of Justice Devlin,
cify the symptoms of fractures or a leading English jurist, who emtyphoid in a legal rule. Insanity is a phatically rejected that same prodisease. Is it not absurd to specify its posal to abandon the McNaghten
symptoms in a rule of law? And the rules, when it was recommended in
Judge concludes his appeal for no Britain by a Royal Commission in

law by a curious reliance upon a very
questionable jurisprudence. For example, he asserts, without documentation, that "Judges and lawyers
boast that there is no definition of
fraud ....
Its very vagueness is said

American Bar Assodiation Journal

27. Cf. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 339, 270
P. 2d 727, 737 (1954): "It impresses me that
... they have for all practical purposes em-

braced the doctrine of 'irresistable [sic] impulse' as a defense in criminal cases" (dissenting opinion).
28. Op. cit. 795.
29. Op. cit. 796.
30. 1 Westermarck, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 269-276 (1912).
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1953Y31 It is not necessary to insist
here that whatever position a psychiatrist or criminologist urged, a lawyer might be expected to place a
heavy burden of proof upon those
who would abandon the rule of law,
especially in the field of criminal liability.
Third, a rule of law specifying the
essential elements of insanity is not
only important and desirable for the
above reasons. It is also warranted on
factual grounds because intelligent
laymen, rather than psychiatrists, are
the best judges of what is normal
and what is abnormal conduct, and
the legal tests reflect the layman's experience. That is not true of bone
fractures or typhoid which are marginal and brief. But normal mental
functioning is daily functioning; and
serious mental disease-with the aid,
sometimes, of the expert's description
of the defendant's actual personality
-can be recognized in the light of,
and by contrast with, daily normal
functioning. One should not here
confuse identification of the fact of
insanity with the psychiatrist's special methods of discovering it or his
expert knowledge of the origin and
therapy of it. Nor should one be misled by the vehement criticism of the
legal tests by clinical psychiatrists
who have rarely studied psychoses in
social contexts which are important
in law. The functions of law include
the social assessment of responsibility
for certain conduct, and there is no
scientific or other reason which invalidates the definition of serious
mental disease ("psychosis") from
that point of view. On the contrary,
there are many good reasons to do
that.
It is significant in this regard that
even the most vehement critics of
criminal responsibility do not advocate that the fact-finding of mental
disease should be taken from the
jury and assigned to experts. But if
insanity is so elusive in its essential
characteristics that it cannot be recognized by intelligent laymen even
after the experts have described it
in detail, as manifested in the personality of the defendant, the logical
conclusions are to permit only psy-
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chiatrists to decide this question and
merely inform the court and the
community of their disposition of
the accused persons. If intelligent
lay jurors can do a better job of the
necessary fact-finding than the experts, 2 that same lay experience,
refined by legal and medical opinion,
can stipulate essential criteria of insanity in legal rules.
When the method and guidance of
long established rules of law are
abandoned, very serious problems
arise. The Durham holding "is simply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or
mental defect." And the court added,
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a
condition which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating." 33 On the premise that the
McNaghten test is not "even typically associated with most serious
mental disorders" and in the absence
of any other legal test, how is a
judge or jury to determine whether
a given act was "the product of mental disease"? In Anglo-American law,
criminal liability is imposed for the
intentional or reckless commission
of forbidden harms. In other words,
a criminal harm is produced by a defendant if he voluntarily committed
it; and voluntary conduct is "the active aspect of intelligence".8 4 Under
the Durham holding, with its acceptance of the enlarged version of "ir31. "If a general question is to be left to
them, why restrict it to sanity or insanity?
Why not ask them in a general way whether
the accused was responsible at all? Under our
system the prosecution must allege and prove
a definite crime. No one would suggest that
the jury should be left with a general question whether the law has been broken or
whether the prisoner should be punished or
not. I believe that a general question on insanity would be just as objectionable. I
think there is great force in the observation
of the minority of the Commission on this
point at p. 286 where they say: 'It is the
traditional duty of our criminal law to lay
down by definition, as clearly as possible, the
essential elements of liability to conviction
and punishment.'" Devlin, Criminal Responsibility and Punishment: Functions of Judge
and Jury, 1 Canm. L. REv. 683 (1954).
32. This is discussed in 65 YALE L. Jour.

154 NASSAU STREET
NEW YORK 38, N.Y.
resistible impulse",3 5 it is quite
possible, 36 indeed there will be encouragement, to admit the normality
of the defendant's intelligence and
nonetheless to defend on the ground
of a mental "disease". In reaching
its verdict, the jury is to exclude the
normal intelligence of a defendant
from its consideration, determine
whether the defendant had a mental
"disease" (as defined above by the
court?) and, finally, decide whether
tie harm he committed was "the
product" (in what sense?) of that
"disease". But if that is the process
of fact-finding, what is there, except
blind faith in experts (which ones?),
to support a finding that there is a
causal connection between the act
and the "disease"? And, especially
when there is a sharp conflict among
the experts, on what grounds and in
the light of what knowledge will a
judge or any other person be able to
appraise the validity of any verdict?
The Durham opinion asserts that
"The jury's range of inquiry will not
be limited to, but may include . . .
whether an accused . . . did not

know the difference between right
and wrong... the jury [will] perform its traditional function . . . to

apply 'our inherited ideas of moral
responsibility to individuals prosecuted for crime . . .' Juries will con-

tinue to make moral judgments...."
Judge Sobeloff also uses reassuring
language: "The right-wrong test is
769-771.
33. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 874875 (1954).
34. Wyatt, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE
AND WILL 153 (1930).
35. See Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d
873-874. See, too, the dissenting opinion, quoted in note 27 supra and Justice Devlin's like
interpretation, quoted 65 YALE L. JouR. 778,

note 63.
36. "The district court further erred in its
charge in requiring the defendant to adduce
proof both that he did not know the differ-

ence between right and wrong and that he
was unable to refrain from doing wrong.
Either condition existing at the time of the
commission of the act and as the result of

some mental defect or disease was sufficient to
make the defendant not guilty." Howard v.

United States, 232 F. 2d 276 (1956)

(court's

italics).
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not completely abandoned; it is
If the purpose of the Durham demerely dethroned from its exclusive cision was to admit all evidence and
preeminence." 37 In appraising these all theories of insanity, it should not
assertions, the reader will recall the have approved the "irresistible imstatement that the McNaghten rules pulse" test. It should have adopted,
are no longer "even typically asso- instead, a neutral
position-that
ciated with most serious mental dis- some psychiatrists hold thus and so
orders", the "irresistible impulse" while others are opposed and hold
theory in its approved unlimited this and that; hence, admit everyversion, the Judge's reference to the thing and leave the entire question
New Hampshire decision, which to the jury without any authorized
represents his proposed reform, as instruction. That, however, while
"sweeping aside the McNaghten avoiding the confusion of the Durrule", 38 other similar statements, ham decision, would represent not
only the abandonment of law but
and his acceptance of the "scientific"
psychiatrist's
self-imposed limita- also a confession of complete ignortions on his testimony, shown, e.g., ance and the utter repudiation of
in the exclusion of "morality and the knowledge and experience of
ethics . . .what to him is a foreign lawyers, judges and intelligent laylanguage ..... ,89 The reader may men as well as of the position of disforensic
psychiatrists
then decide for himself whether the tinguished
whose
work
is
compatible
with legal
above assurances are worth something or whether they are merely values and methods. Actually, as
verbal, wholly unwarranted conclu- Professor Robinson pointed out,
sions from premises which point in there is no defensible escape from
the task of deciding what is sound
the very opposite direction.
With reference to the insistence psychiatry with reference to legal
that the present rules exclude im- problems and objectives.
portant evidence of insanity, it
should be noted, first, that not the Beyond Durham . .
slightest proof has been adduced to A Tyranny of Experts?
support that claim; on the contrary, The title of Judge Sobeloff's article
it is admitted even by opponents of includes the words "From McNaghthe rules that the courts interpret ten to Durham, and Beyond", which
them very liberally. Second, in view suggests that other changes in that
of the fact that the control of volun- direction are to follow. In terms of
tary conduct depends upon normal the Western tradition, the alternaintelligence, there is no reason under tive to and aftermath of the abanthe McNaghten rules to exclude evi- donment of law is tyranny; and the
dence of impulsive or other irra- history of criminal law in recent and
tional behavior. Third, while the current dictatorships, with their typview that a normal personality func- ical espousal of "science", does not
tions as a unit implies that evidence encourage the concentration of powof disordered volition as well as of er over life and liberty in the hands
disordered intelligence should be ad- of psychiatrists.40 The Judge's dismitted, it is inconsistent to advocate cussion of what lies beyond Durham
the inclusive admission of evidence reveals a strong preference for reregarding all the principal phases of habilitation and serious doubts repersonality and, at the same time, garding punishment. Presumably,
accept the "irresistible impulse" most thoughtful persons prefer cortheory in any of its formulations.
rective methods over merely puni-

988 American Bar Association Journal

Live ones. But such a general dis-

position or preference does not aid
solution of the specific complex
problems arising from the various
objectives of criminal law. Besides,
everything depends on the primary
questions, who is to decide whether
the accused is normal or psychotic
and by what methods shall that be
determined? Intelligent fact-finding,
guided and limited by the rule of
law and the advice of experts, not
the unfettered power of the latter, is
the tried, humanitarian method of
securing the best results.
If no rule of law specifies essential
criteria of insanity, the door is
thrown wide open to serious abuse.
There may be nothing then to restrain an expert, e.g., where community feeling is aroused or a powerful
complainant is interested, from testifying, or to keep a jury from being
led to believe, that a definitely psychotic defendant is sane. 41 Nor is it
a disservice to the many conscientious psychiatrists who testify in
court to recall Professor Edmund
Morgan's observation that "In litigation involving . . . alleged mental
irresponsibility and the like, the
medical expert has become a stench
in the nostrils of upright judges
If, more often, the abandon.. "42
ment of legal tests would facilitate
the acquittal of normal serious offenders, that would undermine the
legal order, which cannot retain the
influence necessary to protect the
innocent if it is impotent to cope
with major, normal criminals. And
37. Op. cit. 796.

38. Op. cit. 794.
39. Op. cit. 877.

40. See Dr. Wertham's article, Psychoauthoritarianismand the Law, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv.

336 (1955).
41. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 194, 204 note 59
(1955).

42. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obatrsetione to Expert Testimony by Rules of Xvidence, 10 U. Cu. L. RzV. 292-293 (1943).
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it is safe to predict that the abandonment of legal tests in other areas
would encourage attempts to acquire
the property of alleged "incompe,
tents" through the nefarious use of
43
psychiatric testimony.
Accordingly, although the writer
endorses judge Sobeloff's suggestion
that "Means must be found to bring
the legal and medical professions together on common ground", it is
clear that some of the proposed
means cannot lead to that goal. Certainly, there is no reason why, when
a lawyer turns to a field like psychiatry, he should abandon his knowledge and critical faculties and assume that everything there is science.
Nor is it necessary to jettison the
rule and method of law in order to
make use of psychiatry. There are
areas of psychiatry which can immediately be made the basis of fruitful
co-operation among the professions,
e.g., the theory of the integration of
normal personality, which supports
a wide definition of the term "know"
in the McNaghten rules. A leading
psychiatrist has appraised this ave-

nue to co-operation as "impressive"
and "helpful", emphasizing that

The 1956 Ross Essay
(Continued from page 938)
statute, among other things, afforded
no protection against the use of
compelled testimony to search out
other evidence to be used against
the witness. And more recently, this
concept of testimony once removed
was given specific recognition by a
district court in a case not involving
an immunity statute. 31 Finally, in
a dissenting opinion in the Emspak
case Justice Harlan recognized the
concept of an incriminating answer
as follows:
The concept of an incriminating
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"When no longer dismembered and
falsified in one-dimensional aspect,
but considered in all that we sometimes imply by 'appreciation,' 'realization,' 'normal evaluation,' 'adequate feeling,' 'significant and appropriate experiencing,' etc., the
term 'knowing' does not restrict us
solely to a discussion of the patient's
44
reasoning abilities in the abstract."
Accordingly, although the courts actually interpret "know" widely, a
revision of the McNaghten rules
which included references to conduct and used the terms "understand" and "realize", would retain
the test of rationality and also provide more appropriate terms from
a psychological viewpoint. 45 This
might also lead to a critical reexamination of the "irresistible impulse" test in the states which now
permit it, and to a consequent revision of the law. It should not be assumed that the co-operation of the
legal profession with psychiatrists
precludes such reforms. Indeed, the
best evidence that the two professions were co-operating would be
joint efforts to improve the law in
the states and districts which now

apply the "irresistible impulse" test.
There are other avenues to co-operation which would preserve the distinctive functions of law and at the
same time make use of the progress
of psychiatry and other empirical
knowledge.
In such efforts, it must never be
forgotten that very important values
are involved, especially that it is the
function of the legal order to maintain and encourage-not to undermine-personal responsibility. The
responsibility of lawyers is to support
and improve the law not to abandon it and allow power to be concentrated in the hands of experts.

answer includes not only those answers which constitute an admission of
guilt, but also those which may furnish evidence of guilt or merely supply a lead to obtaining such evidence.
Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547
(1892) .32

the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure
could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim "must be governed
as much by his personal perception of
the peculiarities of the case as by the
facts actually in evidence". See Taft,
J., in Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960

Following the concept of a link
in a chain to its logical conclusion,
the answer to the most innocuous
question could conceivably tend to
incriminate. However, the Supreme
33
Court in Hoffman v. United States
gives us this test:
To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to

43. See Smith, Cross-Examination of Neuropsychiatric Testimony in Personal Injury
Cases, 4 VAND. L. REv. 15 (1950).
44. Cleckley, MASK OF SANITY

497 (2d ed.
1950); Hall, Psychiatry and the Law, 38 IowA
L. REV. 696 (1953).

45. E.g. "A crime is not committed by anyone who, because of a mental disease, is
unable to understand what he is doing and to
control his conduct at the time he commits a
harm forbidden by criminal law. In deciding
this question with reference to the criminal
conduct with which a defendant is charged,
the trier of the facts should decide (1) whether, because of mental disease, the defendant
lacked the capacity to understand the physical
nature and consequences of his conduct; and
(2) whether, because of such disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to realize that It
was morally wrong to commit the harm in
question." This is discussed in 65 YALE L.
JouR. 781-782.

(C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1896) .34

The setting or circumstances in
which a particular question is asked
seems to be of utmost importance
when a question innocent on its face
31. United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495

(D. Ct., D.C. 1951).
32. 349 U.S. 190, 204, 205 (1955).
33. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
34. 341 U.S. 479, 486, 487 (1951).
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